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ESSAY
DEAD AGAIN: THE LATEST DEMISE
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Michael D. Cicchini*
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court abandoned its Roberts
“reliability” approach to the right of confrontation. The Court conceded
that the Roberts decision had killed the Confrontation Clause by: (1)
impermissibly tying the right of confrontation to the rule against hearsay;
(2) inappropriately allowing pretrial determinations of reliability to replace
actual cross-examination at trial; (3) relying too heavily on malleable,
multi-factor balancing tests; and (4) completely failing to constrain judicial
discretion. Since Crawford, however, the Court has decided Davis v.
Washington and Michigan v. Bryant. Unfortunately, in the course of
deciding those cases the Court has once again killed the Confrontation
Clause. More specifically, the Court has developed yet another framework
that incorporates every single one of Roberts’s flaws, including its failure
to constrain judicial discretion. This Essay exposes the underlying reasons
for the Court’s failure, offers a solution to the problem, and provides
suggestions for the Court when deciding future cases that involve the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
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INTRODUCTION: DEAD AND DEAD AGAIN
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees, quite simply
and clearly, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 1 This right to
cross-examine one’s accuser is so basic to our fundamental sense of fairness
that the U.S. Supreme Court has called it a “bedrock procedural
guarantee.” 2 Furthermore, its importance is easily understood. Few among
us would have confidence in the typical criminal conviction unless, at a
bare minimum, the accuser appeared at trial, took an oath (or made an
affirmation) to tell the truth, and was cross-examined about his biases,
motives, and ability to accurately recall the events about which he testified.
But despite its simplicity and clarity, the Confrontation Clause has been
the subject of thousands of articles and court opinions, each debating or
deciding its proper reach and scope in every imaginable circumstance.3
And although law reviews and courts continue to publish these articles and
opinions, the Confrontation Clause, for all practical purposes, died in 1980
with the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts. 4
In Roberts, the Court held that a prosecutor could use hearsay evidence at
trial to convict a defendant if a judge, using a multi-factor balancing test,
first found the hearsay to be reliable.5 For reasons explained later in this
Essay, this highly subjective, fact-intensive, malleable standard “fail[ed] to
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.”6
Prosecutors, with the blessing of trial judges, routinely ran roughshod over
defendants’ rights and often won convictions based primarily, if not
entirely, on untested hearsay allegations. The Confrontation Clause was
dead.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
3. For a broad sampling of relevant cases, articles, and other commentary, see Richard
D. Friedman, CONFRONTATION BLOG, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2011).
4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. See id. at 66.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
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In 2004, however, the Court decided Crawford v. Washington 7 and
(temporarily) breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause. In
Crawford, the Court conceded that it had been misinterpreting the
Constitution for the past twenty-five years, in part because it had allowed
trial judges to use multi-factor balancing tests and their own judgments
about reliability to replace actual cross-examination at trial.8 While the
Court’s admission was of little consolation to the many thousands of
individuals who had been convicted and imprisoned (or worse) based on
hearsay they could not cross-examine, it was a welcome concession
nonetheless. In fact, many hailed Crawford as a great “sea change” in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.9 A new day, it seemed, was dawning.
But the more things changed, the more they stayed the same. Despite the
Court’s mea culpa, Crawford failed to cure the numerous ills of Roberts,
and instead created a new standard that classified hearsay as either
testimonial or nontestimonial.10 If, and only if, the hearsay was testimonial,
the Confrontation Clause banned its use at trial; otherwise, a prosecutor
could use the nontestimonial hearsay as he wished.11 But what exactly is
this newly created concept—testimonial hearsay—on which the
Constitution’s “bedrock procedural guarantee” now turns? 12 The Court’s
answer: “We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.’” 13
After Crawford, over the course of seven years and two cases—first
Davis v. Washington 14 in 2006 and then Michigan v. Bryant 15 in 2011—the
Court attempted to put some meat on the bones of its revamped
Confrontation Clause. 16 But instead of resuscitating it as many had hoped,
7. Id. at 36.
8. See id. at 67 (“But we view this as one of those rare cases in which the result below
is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution
in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.”).
9. See, e.g., State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (“Effecting a sea
change in our understanding of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause . . . .”); Chris Hutton, Sir Walter
Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause
Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 61 (2005) (“This is a sea change
for prosecution of cases involving child witnesses.”); Andrew King-Ries, State v. Mizenko:
The Montana Supreme Court Wades into the Post-Crawford Waters, 67 MONT. L. REV. 275,
313 (2006) (“Mizenko, therefore, recognizes Crawford’s sea-change in confrontation
rights . . . .”).
10. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.
11. See id. at 68.
12. Testimonial hearsay was, indeed, a newly created concept. See id. at 71–72
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“Starting with Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation as a
Circuit Justice in 1807 . . . through today, we have never drawn a distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements. And for that matter, neither has any other court
of which I am aware.” (citations omitted)).
13. Id. at 68 (majority opinion).
14. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
15. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
16. The Court has issued other post-Crawford opinions on the Confrontation Clause, but
none that are relevant to the issue addressed in this Essay. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (addressing a defendant’s right to cross-examine the
particular analyst that created the forensic laboratory report being used by the state);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (addressing whether a forensic
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the Court slowly and painfully developed yet another highly subjective,
fact-intensive, malleable standard—the very thing it condemned in
Crawford. 17 This, unfortunately, is the current state of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence under Crawford-Davis-Bryant. The Confrontation
Clause is dead again.
The purpose of this Essay is not to make sense of a defendant’s
confrontation rights in this Crawford-Davis-Bryant world; that is not
possible. Law professor Daniel Blinka accurately describes the Court’s
most recent case, Bryant, as “a train wreck,” and sympathizes that “[f]or the
defense lawyers and prosecutors who must eat this mush . . . every day, you
have my best wishes and these words of solace.” 18 Similarly, law professor
Richard Friedman describes Bryant as “remarkably mushy, unjustified by
any sound reasoning and virtually incoherent.”19 Likewise, Justice Scalia
acknowledges in his Bryant dissent that the Court “distorts our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”20
Rather, the purpose of this Essay is two-fold. First, I will demonstrate
precisely how the Court has once again killed the Confrontation Clause, this
time with its Crawford-Davis-Bryant triumvirate of cases. 21 My hope is
that exposing the underlying mechanics of this debacle will prevent a
similar demise of other constitutional rights in the future. Second, I will
also demonstrate that these Confrontation Clause decisions are not worthy
laboratory report is testimonial); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (addressing when a
defendant’s actions constitute a forfeiture of the right of confrontation). The Court has also
granted certiorari in People v. Williams to address whether the state can introduce a forensic
laboratory report not for the truth of the matter asserted, but ostensibly to show the basis for
the testifying expert’s opinion. 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090
(2011).
17. See infra Part II.
18. Daniel D. Blinka, More “Bullcoming”?
The Court Courts Confusion in
Confrontation, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/
facultyblog/2011/03/03/more-“bullcoming”-the-court-courts-confusion-in-confrontation/.
19. Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision,
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
2011/03/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html.
20. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia should have
foreseen this when he authored the Crawford decision in 2004, but better late than never.
His hindsight criticism, although untimely and far from novel, is accurate.
21. Interestingly, the Court seems to provide greater protection for defendants when the
state’s proffered hearsay takes the form of a forensic laboratory report created by a scientist,
as opposed to a hearsay statement created and repeated by a police officer. See Bullcoming,
131 S. Ct. at 2710 (holding that the defendant has the right to cross-examine the particular
analyst that actually conducted the test); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (holding that a
forensic laboratory report is testimonial evidence). However, this is of little consolation for
three reasons. First, forensic laboratory reports are relatively uncommon when compared to
the hearsay evidence addressed in this Essay. Second, forensic laboratory reports produced
by scientists, while far from error-free, are hardly “the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. And third, the right to
confront the particular scientist that drafted the forensic laboratory report has little or no
practical value to defendants, considering the “likely futility of cross-examining an analyst
who likely had no recollection of this test among the hundreds of those routinely
performed.” Daniel D. Blinka, Bullcoming Arrives, But Where’s the Path?, MARQ. U. L.
SCHOOL FAC. BLOG (June 25, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/06/25/
bullcoming-arrives-but-wheres-the-path/.
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of respect, but rather of criticism. My hope in this regard is that individual
states will, under their state constitutions, provide a genuine right of
confrontation that exceeds the Court’s “hollow constitutional guarantee.”22
I. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: THE COURT COMES CLEAN
In 1980, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts killed the
Confrontation Clause by permitting a prosecutor nearly unrestricted use of
hearsay accusations at trial, thereby completely eviscerating the defendant’s
right to confront his accuser.23 The only prerequisites for introduction of
the hearsay evidence were that the hearsay declarant be unavailable for
trial 24—if he were available, he would have to be called to the witness stand
for live testimony—and that the judge find that the hearsay carried adequate
“indicia of reliability.” 25 This reliability test was satisfied in one of two
ways. If the hearsay fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”
nothing more need be done; it was deemed reliable and therefore
admissible. 26 Or, if after analyzing all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the hearsay, the judge believed the hearsay carried
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” it too was deemed reliable
and therefore admissible. 27
This second, disjunctive prong—simply called the reliability test or the
reliability determination—was often couched in the formality of a factorladen framework. State courts, left to their own devices, would develop
multi-factor balancing tests to decide whether a hearsay statement was
reliable, and therefore admissible. 28 Virtually any factor was fair game for
consideration. For example, one state’s reliability determination depended
on
(1) whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie; (2) whether the
general character of the declarant suggests trustworthiness; (3) whether
more than one person heard the statements; (4) whether the statements
were made spontaneously; (5) whether the timing of the statements and
the relationship between the declarant and the witness suggest
trustworthiness; (6) whether the statements contained express assertions
of past fact; (7) whether cross-examination could not help to show the
declarant’s lack of knowledge; (8) whether the possibility of the
declarant’s recollection being faulty is remote; and (9) whether the

22. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts perhaps seemed reasonable at the
time in light of the particular facts before the Court; that is, the Court permitted the
prosecutor to use a transcript of the defendant’s witness from the preliminary hearing when
the witness became unavailable at trial. Id. at 58–59, 77. It was the way that Roberts was
broadly applied—or perhaps misapplied—thereafter that was most problematic.
24. See id. at 65.
25. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–66 (2004).
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circumstances surrounding the statements give no reason to suppose that
the declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involvement. 29

Regardless of the particular phrasing of the test, the end result was
usually the same: the judge would find the hearsay reliable, thus allowing
the prosecutor to introduce it at trial and leaving the defendant without any
opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. 30 But then, in 2004, the Supreme
Court decided Crawford and adeptly highlighted the numerous and serious
problems with this nearly twenty-five-year-old reliability test. 31 By
identifying these problems and bringing them to the forefront, the Court
seemed well on its way to implementing the long awaited “sea change” and
resuscitating the Confrontation Clause. The following sections address the
fundamental defects that the Crawford Court identified.
A. Roberts Intermingled the Constitution with the Rules of Evidence
The first problem with Roberts was that it intermingled the Confrontation
Clause with the rules of evidence—more specifically, the rule against
hearsay and its thirty or so exceptions. The Court in Crawford rejected the
ideas that the right of confrontation should be synonymous with hearsay
rules or should vary depending upon “‘the law of Evidence for the time
being.’” 32 That is, “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to
the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to
prevent even the most flagrant” confrontation violations.33 The Court
doubted that “the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”34 Instead, the
Confrontation Clause offers protection that is separate and distinct from the
rules of evidence.
B. Roberts Used Pretrial Judicial Determinations of Reliability
as a Substitute for Actual Cross-Examination
The second problem with Roberts was that it permitted the prosecutor to
use untested hearsay to convict a defendant if the judge first conducted a
hearing and found that, in his opinion, the hearsay was reliable. The Court
in Crawford decried this approach as fundamentally flawed: “Dispensing
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
29. State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 425 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). For an equally vague yet
noticeably different set of factors, see Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 197–98 (Colo. 2002)
(en banc), which relied upon the nature and character of the hearsay, as well as the
circumstances under which the hearsay was made, in determining reliability.
30. Even the most unreliable type of hearsay—a self-serving accusation by a
codefendant against a defendant—was admitted by lower courts “more than one-third of the
time,” despite the Supreme Court’s warning “that it was ‘highly unlikely’ that accomplice
confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64.
Other hearsay, of course, is admitted into evidence with far greater frequency.
31. See id. at 62–65.
32. Id. at 51 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 61.
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dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is
not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”35 More precisely, the
Confrontation Clause commands “not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.” 36 Accordingly, the protections of the Confrontation
Clause must not hinge on pretrial judicial determinations of reliability.
C. Roberts’s Multi-factor Balancing Test Produced Wildly Unpredictable
and Inconsistent Results
The third problem with Roberts was that its results—whether analyzing
cases on an inter-state basis, an intra-state basis, or even an intra-court
basis—were wildly unpredictable and inconsistent. The cause of this
problem was that “[t]here [were] countless factors bearing on whether a
statement is reliable” and, to make matters worse, “[s]ome courts [wound]
up attaching the same significance to opposite facts.” 37 While this will be
demonstrated in greater detail in Part III.B, two brief examples will quickly
illustrate this point. First, some courts would find a hearsay statement
reliable, and therefore admissible, because it was detailed,38 while other
courts would find a hearsay statement reliable, and therefore admissible,
because it was not detailed. 39 Second, some courts would find a hearsay
statement reliable, and therefore admissible, because the declarant was in
custody and accused of his own crime at the time he made the statement,40
while other courts would find a hearsay statement reliable, and therefore
admissible, because the declarant was not in custody and was not accused
of a crime. 41 This inconsistency and unpredictability is not acceptable for a
fundamental constitutional guarantee.
D. Roberts Completely Failed to Constrain Judicial Discretion
The fourth problem with Roberts is the largest and most critical of its
flaws: the reliability test “reveals a fundamental failure on [the Court’s]
part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended
constraint on judicial discretion.”42 The Court in Crawford believed that
“[t]he Framers would be astounded to learn” that police and other
government officers could be so intricately involved in the production of
accusatory statements, and then courts would allow a prosecutor to use such
hearsay evidence against a defendant at trial without any opportunity for
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (emphasizing that the
declarant “provided detailed descriptions of the events and conversations,” apparently
believing that a liar would be incapable of fabricating details).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th
Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the statement, in relevant part, “was fleeting at best,”
apparently believing that a liar would have provided a greater level of detail).
40. See, e.g., Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 372 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
41. See, e.g., State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶ 12, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918.
42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
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Amazingly, perhaps through decades of
cross-examination. 43
indoctrination, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence had evolved to include
the assumption that police are “neutral” 44 and that judges act in “good
faith.” 45 The problem, however, is that the Framers “would not have been
content to indulge this assumption. They knew that judges, like other
government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of
the people. . . . They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial
hands.” 46
II. CRAWFORD-DAVIS-BRYANT: THE NEW RULE OF CONFRONTATION
The focus of this Essay—and the “principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause [is] directed”—is hearsay statements that were
allegedly made to police and other government agents, and then repeated by
those governmental actors at a defendant’s trial.47 The admissibility of this
type of hearsay is currently governed by Crawford, Davis, and Bryant,
which were decided over the course of seven years. The actual rule of
law—when separated from the Court’s historical diversions, unwarranted
assumptions, figurative hand-wringing, and justifications—is still
convoluted.
First, the protection of the Confrontation Clause is triggered only when a
prosecutor attempts to use testimonial hearsay against a defendant. That is,
when the hearsay is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause prohibits its use
at trial. 48 On the other hand, if the hearsay is nontestimonial, the defendant
is only protected by the Swiss cheese-like rule against hearsay with its
thirty or so exceptions. 49
43. Id. at 66.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 50. Increasingly, since Crawford and Davis, the line between governmentdeveloped hearsay and other hearsay has blurred, due to law enforcement’s use of surrogate
interrogators to bypass the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Stevens, Comment,
Deputy-Doctors: The Medical Treatment Exception After Davis v. Washington, 43 CAL. W.
L. REV. 451, 472 (2007) (arguing that to end this abuse, “courts should treat health care
providers as agents of the police and their interactions with the declarant as police
interrogation” based on principles of agency law).
48. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Unless, of course, the declarant is truly unavailable
for live testimony (for example, if he is deceased) and the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine him (for example, at a previous trial that ended in a mistrial). Id. Even
though the unavailability of a witness, combined with a defendant’s prior opportunity for
cross-examination of that witness, satisfies the Confrontation Clause, it should not. The
reason, of course, is that inherent in the right of confrontation is the cross-examination of the
witness in front of the jury, so that jurors can decide “whether he is worthy of belief.”
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). This benefit is lost, however, when a
prosecutor merely reads a transcript of testimony from a prior trial or other proceeding.
49. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Actually, whether the Confrontation Clause provided
some level of protection against even nontestimonial hearsay was still debated until the
Court’s decision in Davis. See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶ 55, 697 N.W.2d 811,
825 n.10 (identifying jurisdictions that retained Roberts in assessing the admissibility of
nontestimonial statements); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 515 (2005).
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This, then, leads to the question: what is testimonial hearsay?
Testimonial hearsay includes, at a minimum: (1) “prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial”; 50 and (2)
“[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations.”51
But what constitutes a police interrogation? Although the term is well
settled and broadly defined in the Fifth Amendment context, 52 the
definition for Confrontation Clause purposes has been modified to scaledback constitutional protection; that is, only some police interrogations will
produce testimonial hearsay. More specifically:
Statements are nontestimonial [and admissible] when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial [and not admissible] when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution. 53

But the matter is not yet resolved. How does the trial judge determine
the objective, primary purpose of an interrogation? Diving further down
into the depths of this new, murky confrontation framework, the rule is that
the primary purpose depends upon multiple factors possibly including some
or all of the following: (1) whether the statement describes “what is
happening” or “what happened”; 54 (2) if the statement describes “what
happened,” the lapse of time between the incident and the statement;55 (3)
the nature and timing of the questions that produced the statement; 56 (4) the
level of formality surrounding the interrogation; 57 (5) whether the statement
fits within the “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some
statements as reliable”; 58 (6) the place of the interrogation and whether the
declarant was protected by police; 59 (7) the type of crime ultimately
50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
51. Id. at 52.
52. When deciding whether police were required to read a suspect his Miranda rights,
“interrogation” is defined broadly as express questioning and its functional equivalent. See,
e.g., State v. Cunningham, 423 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Wis. 1988) (adopting Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)). Stated differently, an interrogation occurs whenever “the police
officer’s conduct or speech could reasonably have had the force of a question on the
suspect.” Id.
53. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 830.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 832.
57. See id. at 830.
58. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
59. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831. While this intuitively seems to be the most important factor
in determining whether an emergency is ongoing, courts have also disregarded it if it
interfered with their desired outcome. See infra Part III.C; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for ignoring the fact that the declarant
was surrounded by five police officers who asked “the same battery of questions a fifth
time . . . to see if any new details helpful to the investigation and eventual prosecution would
emerge,” and instead finding the emergency to be ongoing, thus making the statements
nontestimonial and admissible).
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alleged; 60 (8) whether a weapon was involved; 61 and (9) the medical
condition of the alleged victim. 62
And the analysis goes on. The trial judge must also consider whether a
statement obtained during the course of a single interrogation has morphed
back and forth between testimonial and nontestimonial, depending on the
objective, primary purpose of the interrogation at any given point in time.63
Moreover, because there are two parties to the interrogation—the police and
the hearsay declarant—there could be two different primary purposes: one
of the questioner and one of the declarant.64 Additionally, one or both of
these individuals could have mixed motives and, therefore, may not even
have a “primary” purpose. 65 For example, an officer may wish to
determine whether an emergency is ongoing and to collect statements for
use in a future prosecution. Similarly, a declarant may wish to seek police
protection from an ongoing threat and to report a past crime. Therefore, the
statement is to be evaluated objectively, from the perspective or
perspectives of one or both of the parties, including all of their competing
motives, at the trial judge’s discretion.
III. GRADING THE COURT’S TESTIMONIAL FRAMEWORK
The Court correctly identified the problems inherent in the Roberts
reliability framework. It acknowledged that the right of confrontation
should not: (1) be intermingled with the rules of evidence; (2) be tied to a
pretrial judicial determination of reliability; (3) hinge on a multi-factor
balancing test; or (4) rely on judicial discretion in its application.66 But the
Court failed to correct those problems. Instead, in Crawford, Davis, and
Bryant, it developed a new confrontation framework that incorporates every
single one of the flaws that it had denounced.
A. Welcome Back: The Return of the Rules of Evidence
and Pretrial Judicial Determinations of Reliability
For all of its faults, Crawford was very clear about two things. First, the
right of confrontation should not vary depending upon “‘the law of
Evidence for the time being.’” 67 The Confrontation Clause is independent
60. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that important to the
“highly context-dependent” inquiry was that the crimes in Davis and Hammon v. Indiana,
547 U.S. 813 (2006), involved domestic violence). The result, of course, is that courts will
have to make factual determinations about, for example, “whether rape and armed robbery
are more like murder or domestic violence.” Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1158 (majority opinion). In addition to deciding the relevance of the type of
crime allegedly being committed, courts will also have to make factual determinations about,
for example, “whether knives and poison are more like guns or fists.” Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at 1159 (majority opinion).
63. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
64. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161.
65. See id.
66. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–64 (2004); see also supra Part I.
67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 3 WIGMORE, supra note 32, at 101).
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of, and more substantial than, the rule against hearsay and its thirty or so
exceptions. 68 Second, Crawford was clear that hearsay should not be
admissible against a defendant merely because a judge determined, before
trial, that it was reliable.69
Given these two very clear mandates of Crawford, it is unlikely that
anyone could have predicted what the Court would do next. While authors
were (understandably) contemplating Crawford’s separation of the
Confrontation Clause from the rule against hearsay, 70 the Court was
actually reversing its course. In Bryant, the Court reunited the Constitution
with the rules of evidence, and reinstituted pretrial judicial reliability
determinations. Specifically, the Court stated that when determining the
objective, primary purpose of an interrogation—which, in turn, determines
whether the interrogation produced testimonial or nontestimonial hearsay
statements—the “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some
statements as reliable, will be relevant.” 71 The Court reasoned that
[t]his logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception
in hearsay law. Statements “relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition,” . . . are considered reliable because the declarant, in
the excitement, presumably cannot form a falsehood. . . . An ongoing
emergency has a similar effect of focusing an individual’s attention on
responding to the emergency. 72

Ignore, for a moment, that because the declarant is necessarily absent
from trial (or there would not be a confrontation issue in the first place), the
police can simply say that the declarant appeared excited—or fearful, or
whatever buzzword a judge wants to hear—thus rendering the hearsay
nontestimonial and admissible.73 After all, it is this type of police-created
hearsay that is “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed.” 74 Also ignore that any person who makes a false allegation to the
police would also make himself appear to be “under the stress of
excitement” from the fabricated event. Finally, ignore that even if genuine
stress and excitement did somehow conspire to prevent a person from
68. See supra Part I.A.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown
of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV.
185 (2004).
71. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphases added).
72. Id. at 1157 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
73. After Crawford was decided, I demonstrated how routinely and easily the police do
this. For example, to squeeze an absent declarant’s statement into the excited utterance
hearsay exception, the prosecutor merely asks the officer to “describe [the declarant’s]
demeanor when she gave the statement to you,” and the officer need only reply, “‘Um, rather
excited.’” Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v.
Washington: Defining “Testimonial,” 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 550 (2006)
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Searcy, 2006 WI App 8, ¶ 11, 709 N.W.2d 497,
502). Based on this, the hearsay exception is deemed satisfied, and the statement is then
admissible. Id.
74. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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lying—an untested idea developed in the eighteenth century to admit the
hearsay of child declarants 75—the Court’s holding still says nothing about
hearsay where the declarant was honestly mistaken or delusional; such
statements continue to go uncross-examined. Even ignoring these three
defects in the Court’s reasoning, we are still left with the underlying,
fundamental problem that has plagued the Court since Roberts: “reliability
continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where
emergencies and faux emergencies are concerned.”76
In fact, despite all of its bravado in Crawford, the Court changed nothing
of substance, and only slightly modified the form of its analysis by adding
an intermediate layer. That is, under Roberts, a trial judge would use the
rules of evidence to find a hearsay statement to be reliable and therefore
admissible without any cross-examination. Now, under Crawford-DavisBryant, a trial judge uses the rules of evidence to find a hearsay statement
reliable, and therefore nontestimonial, and therefore admissible without any
cross-examination. Despite this newly added intermediate step, however,
the same Sixth Amendment problem remains. 77
So, with respect to the use of hearsay rules and pretrial determinations of
reliability, the Court failed to correct the problems of Roberts.
Unfortunately, however, this was just the beginning of the Court’s failures.
As the next sections illustrate, the Court also refused to replace Roberts’s
multi-factor balancing test and neglected to replace, or even constrain,
Roberts’s use of judicial discretion.
B. Same Old Song and Dance: Another Multi-factor Balancing Test Leads
to Continued Unpredictability
While many were surprised that the Supreme Court chose to reunite the
Confrontation Clause with the rules of evidence and resuscitate the pretrial
determination of reliability, the Court’s other failures were both predictable
and predicted.
As discussed in Part I, the Crawford Court condemned the multi-factor
reliability test of Roberts for being “[v]ague,” 78 “malleable,” 79 and
“entirely subjective,” 80 thus leading to its wild “unpredictability,”81 even
when applied in good faith. However, as discussed in Part II, the Court
then adopted an equally vague, malleable, subjective, multi-factor test in
Crawford-Davis-Bryant, which could only lead to equally unpredictable
results.

75. See John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to
Psychological Science, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 3, 4. The idea underlying
the excited utterance exception—“that trauma momentarily stills the capacity or motivation
to lie”—is “unsupported by empirical evidence.” Id. at 8.
76. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See supra text accompanying note 35.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id. at 60.
80. Id. at 63.
81. Id.
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This is not hindsight criticism; shortly after Crawford was decided, I
warned that the Court’s new framework was nothing more than “a factsand-circumstances analysis to determine if the proffered hearsay falls
within [the] definition [of testimonial].”82 “Once again, hearsay would be
admitted into evidence as the result of judges applying vague standards, but
this time under a different label: testimonial rather than reliable.”83 And,
of course, “inconsistent and unpredictable rulings also remain.” 84 It was
not long before this early prediction was proven correct by simply
comparing the unpredictability of lower courts’ Roberts decisions with the
unpredictability of their post-Crawford decisions.
As demonstrated in Part I.C, under the Roberts test one court would find
hearsay reliable because the declarant was in custody when he made the
statement; another court would find hearsay reliable because the declarant
was not in custody when he made the statement.85 Similarly, one court
would find hearsay reliable because it was detailed; another court would
find hearsay reliable because it was not detailed. 86
But this Roberts unpredictability was not limited to an inter-court
analysis; intra-court analyses would reveal similar results. For example,
one court found hearsay reliable because the statement was made
immediately after the criminal episode; 87 however, in a case only four
months earlier, that same court found hearsay reliable because the statement
was made a full two years after the criminal episode. 88
In Crawford, the Court even cited the case’s own procedural history as a
“self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable and inconsistent
application.” 89 First, the state trial court found the hearsay reliable; then the
state appellate court reversed the trial court, finding the hearsay unreliable;
then the state supreme court reversed the appellate court, finding the
hearsay reliable; and finally, the U.S. Supreme Court, had it not overruled
the Roberts multi-factor balancing test, would have reversed the state
supreme court “by simply reweighing the ‘reliability factors’ under Roberts
and finding that [the declarant’s] statement falls short.” 90

82. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 540; see also Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford
Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 70 (2005)
(“Crawford is only another balancing test, with the balancing now being carried out in
deciding whether any statement should be labeled testimonial.”).
83. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 541.
84. Id.; see also Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the
“Testimonial Statements” Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
387, 398 (2005) (noting that it is “apparent that the Supreme Court’s refusal to articulate a
definition of ‘testimonial statements’ has resulted in irreconcilable evidentiary rulings”).
85. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
87. People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (noting that the statement was
timely, and apparently believing that memories are sharpest shortly after the incident).
88. Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 315–16 (Colo. 2001) (finding it impressive that the
statement was delayed, apparently believing that memories get sharper as time passes).
89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004).
90. Id. at 67.
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There is no question that Roberts produced wildly inconsistent results;
this was, after all, one of the reasons the Court tried to change its course in
Crawford. However, the post-Crawford cases told a similar story. The
factors in the multi-factor balancing test changed—instead of determining
whether hearsay was reliable, courts were now looking to a different set of
factors to determine, for example, whether there was an ongoing emergency
at the time of the statement—but the unpredictable results remained the
same.
For example, Davis held that when a suspect leaves the scene of a
domestic violence incident, the emergency has ended.91 This is because the
scope of potential danger in a domestic violence incident is very narrow
relative to non-domestic crimes, and is nearly always limited to the
domestic partner. 92 Consequently, with no ongoing emergency, all
subsequent statements by the alleged victim-declarant to the police are
testimonial, and therefore not admissible. Conversely, a Minnesota
appellate court held that when a suspect leaves the scene of a domestic
violence incident, the emergency is still ongoing. 93 This is because the
alleged domestic abuser could, at least hypothetically, decide to attack
other, unrelated parties.94 Consequently, because the (faux) emergency is
still ongoing, all subsequent statements by the alleged victim-declarant to
the police are nontestimonial, and therefore admissible.
Interestingly, both courts are wrong. The Minnesota court is stretching to
create an ongoing emergency where none exists. The Supreme Court is off
base as well because statistics show that, in addition to the common
domestic dispute, even non-domestic homicides have a very narrow scope
of potential danger: “almost 90 percent of murders involve a single
victim.” 95 This means that once the suspect has left the scene, and the
police have responded and are safely surrounding the alleged victim, the
emergency has ended. 96 However, the reason the Supreme Court tried to
distinguish the facts of Bryant—the non-domestic murder case it was
deciding—from the facts of Davis—a domestic violence case it had already
decided—is that it had backed itself into a corner with its Davis decision.
And it had to somehow escape this corner to find that the declarant’s

91. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (“In this case, for example, after
the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the
emergency appears to have ended (when [the defendant] drove away from the premises).”).
92. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158 (2011) (“Domestic violence cases
like Davis and Hammon often have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving
threats to public safety.”).
93. See State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 641–42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
94. See id. (“We conclude that the ‘ongoing emergency’ referred to in Davis . . . need
not be limited to the complainant’s predicament or the location where she is questioned by
police.”).
95. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2009 FBI homicide data).
96. See id. at 1172–73 (“Because almost 90 percent of murders involve a single victim,
it is much more likely—indeed, I think it certain—that the officers viewed their encounter
with [the declarant] for what it was: an investigation into a past crime with no ongoing or
immediate consequences.”).
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statement in Bryant was made during an ongoing emergency. 97 Thus, it
crafted a distinction between the two types of crimes. 98
But this only touches the surface of the post-Crawford inconsistencies.
In a different class of police-generated hearsay, courts are often called upon
to determine whether an alleged victim’s hearsay statement to a medical
professional was made for a medical diagnosis—which would make it
nontestimonial and therefore admissible—or a criminal prosecution—which
would make it testimonial and therefore inadmissible. In this situation, one
court found a declarant’s statement to a government nurse (and mandatory
reporter) to be nontestimonial, and therefore admissible, because a police
officer first took a statement from the declarant and then brought her to the
government nurse to repeat the statement. 99 However, a different court also
found this type of hearsay to be nontestimonial, and therefore admissible,
but so found because a police officer purposely avoided taking a statement
from the declarant, and instead sent her directly to the government nurse to
make her allegation. 100
On an intra-court basis, even the Supreme Court has produced
unpredictable and inconsistent results within its own decisions; that is,
sometimes it reaches completely opposite conclusions despite nearly
identical sets of facts. For example, in Davis it found that a statement was
testimonial, and therefore not admissible, because the declarant described
past events, rather than an ongoing incident, to police. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the police were actually investigating a past crime for later
criminal prosecution. 101 In Bryant, however, the Court found that a
statement was nontestimonial, and therefore admissible, even though this
particular declarant also described past events, rather than an ongoing
incident, to police. 102 The police even admitted that their purpose for
questioning the declarant was to “find out who did this, period.”103 Despite
this, the Court decided that the police officer’s purpose was not to
investigate a past crime for later criminal prosecution because the police
officer did not specifically say to the declarant, “Tell us who did this to you
so that we can arrest and prosecute them.” 104 Once the nontestimonial label
was affixed to the statement, of course, it was admissible.
97. See infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
98. This distinction also opened up Pandora’s Box: with the many hundreds of different
types of crimes that each state legislature has created, courts will now have to make
judgments about whether, for example, “rape and armed robbery are more like murder or
domestic violence.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. See State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855 N.E.2d 834, at ¶ 46.
100. See In re A.J.A., No. A06-479, 2006 WL 2474267, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 29,
2006).
101. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006) (finding statements testimonial
because police officers were “not seeking to determine . . . ‘what is happening,’ but rather
‘what happened’”).
102. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011).
103. Id. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
104. Id. at 1161 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). The Court essentially provided the
police with a blueprint of how to handle an interrogation, including what not to say, so that
any statements produced in that interrogation will be labeled nontestimonial, and will

1316

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

These ongoing, highly inconsistent results do not happen by chance; as
discussed above, they happen because the Court replaced one subjective,
malleable, factor-laden standard with another subjective, malleable, factorladen standard. As this section demonstrates, and as Justice Scalia now
admits, the nine-factor balancing test of Crawford-Davis-Bryant is “no
better than the nine-factor balancing test” of Roberts. 105
The Court first criticized the Roberts reliability test for allowing judges
to weigh “countless factors” 106 in their analysis and for leaving “too much
discretion in judicial hands.” 107 Then, only seven years later, it criticized
the Supreme Court of Michigan for not recognizing that the new testimonial
standard of Crawford-Davis-Bryant is “a highly context-dependant
inquiry” 108 in which judges should not be “unjustifiably restrained from
consulting all relevant information.”109
Does the Court not realize that having a balancing test with “countless
factors” is the same as making “a highly context-dependent inquiry”? 110
Either test violates the Confrontation Clause. Justice Thomas’s dissents in
both Davis and Bryant acknowledged what I predicted shortly after
Crawford: replacing one open-ended balancing test with another will
continue to produce the same unpredictable results.111 Furthermore, despite
the Court’s claim that the complexity of its newest multi-factor balancing
test increases accuracy, 112 the new framework is, at best, “‘an exercise in
fiction.’” 113 And, as the next section demonstrates, it is, at worst, a tool for
therefore be admissible. It is not likely that the police needed this Court-created blueprint,
however, as they are quite skilled at adapting their practices to bypass constitutional
protections. See, e.g., Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 545–51 (explaining the adaptability
of police practices and demonstrating the phenomenon in numerous contexts).
105. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
107. Id. at 67.
108. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 1162.
110. Id. at 1158. Justice Scalia now matter-of-factly admits, “It can be said, of course,
that under Crawford analysis of whether a statement is testimonial requires consideration of
all the circumstances, and so is also something of a multifactor balancing test.” Id. at 1176
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 541.
112. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent by stating
that “we, at least, are unwilling to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity”).
113. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). By the time of Davis,
Justice Thomas realized the folly in the Court’s new framework, but he still failed to
appreciate the nature of the right of confrontation. That is, he wrote in his Bryant
concurrence that the Court’s decision “illustrates the uncertainty that this test creates for law
enforcement.” Id. There are two problems with this statement. First, the Confrontation
Clause is a trial right and the Court’s decisions should not, in any way, affect law
enforcement practices. Second, as discussed in the next section, the Court’s decisions do
affect law enforcement testimony in pretrial hearings. However, there is nothing “uncertain”
about what law enforcement has to do. They have the very clear and simple task of
testifying that they were concerned for somebody’s safety—whether their own, the
declarant’s, or even the general public’s—to satisfy the ongoing emergency test. See infra
Part III.C. The police are well schooled in this type of manipulation, especially in the Fourth
Amendment context. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence”
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judges to abuse their already overly broad discretion that Crawford-DavisBryant was supposed to constrain.
C. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Judicial Discretion Under a Different Label
Another failure of Crawford-Davis-Bryant that was predictable and
predicted is closely related to the Court’s love of multi-factor balancing
tests: the new testimonial framework has completely failed to eliminate, or
even constrain, judicial discretion. 114 Specifically, under Roberts, when the
police are involved in the creation of accusatory statements, and the
declarant of those statements is not available for trial, the police—with the
help of the prosecutor and the complicity of the judge—simply reconstruct
the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement so that
it satisfies the reliability test. 115
But the Court’s new framework relies just as heavily on judicial
discretion, and admits police-created hearsay just as easily. The only
difference is that now, the police—again with the help of the prosecutor and
the complicity of the judge—simply reconstruct the facts and circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement so that it is labeled nontestimonial.
And, because Bryant held that one of the factors that makes a statement
nontestimonial is whether the judge finds it to be reliable,116 nothing has
really changed since the days of Roberts.
After Crawford, I demonstrated how easily police and prosecutors were
bypassing the Court’s new testimonial framework, and warned that judicial
discretion was not being constrained as intended. Once the police and
prosecutors created their desired set of facts surrounding the hearsay
statement, trial judges blindly accepted their version of events. I further
wrote that:
Under Crawford, therefore, the need for judicial discretion has not been
eliminated, but merely transferred from one determinative issue—whether
the hearsay is reliable—to another determinative issue—whether the
hearsay is testimonial. Trial judges, who “could not always be trusted to
safeguard the rights of the people,” are now deciding which hearsay is
testimonial and must be excluded, and which hearsay is non-testimonial
and therefore may be admitted. The end result, therefore, is the same as it
was under Roberts: the admission of hearsay is still based on judicial
discretion, untested by cross-examination. 117

as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 233, 249 (1998) (discussing how police perjury designed to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment “is identical from one case to another”).
114. See supra Part I.D.
115. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 548.
116. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (majority opinion) (explaining that when deciding the
primary purpose of an interrogation, which in turn dictates a statement’s status as testimonial
or nontestimonial, “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as
reliable, will be relevant”); see also supra Part III.A.
117. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 540. Some others provided an early warning of
this as well. See, e.g., David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial
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Unfortunately, this and similar criticisms fell on deaf ears as the Court
continued down the path of its new testimonial framework when it decided
Davis. Then, shortly after Davis, I again wrote about the continued abuse
of judicial discretion under the testimonial framework. 118 For example,
with respect to expanding the ongoing emergency, even in cases where an
allegedly violent incident had ended, and the alleged victim-declarant was
safely in the presence of police, courts would still deem the emergency to
be “ongoing.” 119 How? “If situations can be upgraded to ongoing
emergencies simply because a defendant might commit an unspecified
crime at some unspecified time in the future against an unspecified victim,
then every situation will be automatically transformed into an ongoing
emergency.” 120 The result is that the hearsay statement will be labeled as
nontestimonial, and will therefore be admissible.
Now, several years later, Justice Scalia realizes this precise point. In his
Bryant dissent he writes that, with regard to the ongoing emergency, the
Court’s open-ended balancing test created too much room for “judicial
mischief.” 121 Because the police can always make a claim that there is a
public threat, “a defendant will have no constitutionally protected right to
exclude the uncross-examined testimony of such witnesses.” 122 And, just
as I had warned years earlier that the means by which a court could expand
the ongoing emergency would be limited only by “judicial imagination and
creativity,” 123 Scalia now criticizes his fellow justices for their “active
imagination” in finding an ongoing emergency where none exists. 124 This
critique is remarkable, coming from the Justice who set it all in motion
when he authored the Crawford opinion, and perpetuated it with Davis.
Similarly, and also shortly after Davis, I illustrated how courts were
distorting the primary purpose test. For example, even when an alleged
victim-declarant was specifically told, before making a statement, that the
Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 995, 1005 (2005) (describing the “urgency, on [one] court’s part, to establish that
Crawford does not impose an obstacle” to victimless prosecutions and discussing “judges’
predisposition to believe the prosecution’s version of domestic assaults”); Moody, supra
note 84, at 394 (“[W]hen courts stubbornly insist on admitting hearsay evidence that they
believe should be admitted despite Crawford’s exclusion of testimonial evidence, they must
creatively circumvent the Crawford test with inventive evidentiary rulings.”).
118. See Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts Circumvent the
Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 767 (2008)
(“Repeatedly, courts completely distort the Clause—as interpreted in Crawford and Davis—
in order to accomplish a predetermined goal of admitting hearsay evidence against
defendants.”).
119. Id. at 768–70.
120. Id. at 770; see also Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause
After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
11, 12
(2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/fine.pdf (“When
determining the ‘primary purpose’ of questioning, it will be difficult for courts to ignore an
officer’s claim that he believed the emergency to be ongoing when he questioned the
declarant.”).
121. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1173.
123. Cicchini, supra note 118, at 767.
124. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statement would be used in “the investigation and prosecution of this
crime,” courts would still find that the primary purpose of the interrogation
was not to prove past events for later criminal prosecution. 125 How? By
pure speculation that, despite the clear warning and purpose of the
interrogator, the declarant could still (somehow) have imagined a different
purpose for the statement.126 And, with nothing more than this judicial
slight-of-hand, the hearsay statement will be labeled nontestimonial, and
will therefore be admissible. In light of cases like this, it was obvious that
courts could simply “distort the Clause . . . in order to accomplish a
predetermined goal of admitting hearsay evidence against defendants.”127
Justice Scalia now appreciates this issue as well. In his Bryant dissent,
he writes that, regarding the primary purpose test, courts now have the
discretion “to sort through two sets of mixed motives to determine the
primary purpose of an interrogation.” 128 Specifically, he concedes that:
If the defendant “deserves” to go to jail, then a court can focus on
whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial. And when all else fails, a court can mix-and-match
perspectives [of the declarant and the police officer] to reach its desired
outcome. Unfortunately, under this malleable approach “the guarantee of
confrontation is no guarantee at all.” 129

This continued use (and abuse) of judicial discretion did not happen by
chance; instead, it happened because the Court adopted a framework where,
instead of deciding whether a statement is reliable, trial judges make an
equally subjective determination of whether a statement is testimonial. In
both situations, their finding is a prerequisite for the admissibility of the
declarant’s statement. Furthermore, the Crawford-Davis-Bryant framework
actually requires even more judicial discretion than Roberts. That is, trial
judges not only have to decide the primary purpose of an interrogation—
which determines whether the statement is testimonial—but they first have
to decide whether the declarant’s or police officer’s perspective should be
used, 130 whether there is a primary purpose at all,131 and, if so, whether the
primary purpose of one or both parties changed at any point during the
interrogation. 132
125. See Cicchini, supra note 118, at 772 (quoting State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 837
(Ohio 2006)).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 767.
128. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying
note 20.
129. Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).
130. See id. at 1161 (majority opinion) (looking to the intentions of both parties, the Court
claims, “ameliorates problems that could arise from looking solely to one participant”).
131. See id. at 1155 (“Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a
statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause.”).
132. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29 (2006) (“This is not to say that a
conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency
assistance cannot . . . evolve into testimonial statements.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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The Court should have realized, as some of us did, that its initial
Crawford framework would be no better than Roberts at constraining
judicial discretion. And although the Court did not realize it then, it should
have realized it by reading some of the lower courts’ post-Crawford
decisions before it decided Davis—a case in which the Court expanded
judicial discretion. Or it should have finally realized it, as Justice Scalia
did, by reading some of the lower courts’ post-Davis decisions before it
decided Bryant—a case in which, despite overwhelming evidence that
lower courts continued to abuse their discretion, the Court continued to
expand its multi-factor testimonial framework and give judges even more
discretion.
IV. THE SOLUTION: A TRIAL-BASED APPROACH
TO TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
The solution to the problem was (and is) amazingly simple. The inquiry
should not be on the facts and circumstances of how a hearsay statement
was allegedly made—for example, where an officer testifies, after the fact,
that the declarant appeared excited and fearful for his safety. Nor should it
be on how a hearsay statement was allegedly collected—for example,
where an officer testifies that he asked questions to address an ongoing
emergency, rather than to investigate a past crime. 133 In a Confrontation
Clause scenario, the details of the making or taking of a statement are only
available months or years later through the interrogating officer, and are
subject to his memory and manipulation; after all, such statements are
almost never recorded and they are rarely witnessed by anyone other than
the police. 134
To acknowledge, as the Crawford Court did, that police-developed
hearsay evidence is “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause

133. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 546 (“The significant point is that any factsand-circumstances test will, by its very nature, allow for easy circumvention of constitutional
protection.”). After Crawford, however, most commentators were advocating for more of
the same—i.e., more facts-and-circumstances balancing tests. See, e.g., Richard D.
Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 252–55
(2005) (advocating a facts-and-circumstances test to determine “whether the declarant
understood that there was a significant probability that the statement would be used in
prosecution”); Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under Crawford: What Makes
Testimony . . . Testimonial?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 289 (2005) (advocating a balancing test
to determine whether “the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement [made] its
formal, adjudicative use foreseeable to the declarant”); Whitney Baugh, Note, Why the Sky
Didn’t Fall: Using Judicial Creativity to Circumvent Crawford v. Washington, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1835, 1868–69 (2005) (advocating a facts-and-circumstances test to determine
whether a proffered statement is testimonial).
134. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 548 (“The [government] agent could simply
testify that the statement was not made under structured questioning, or whatever the
applicable test may be at the time, and there would likely be nothing to contradict the agent’s
version of events.”); see also Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony”
Does Not Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 147, 205 (2006) (“One problem with focusing on how evidence is
gathered . . . is that it permits manipulation by police and police agents.”).
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was directed,” 135 and then to rely on the police officer’s post-incident
reconstruction of events (after he consults with the prosecutor, no less) to
determine whether the hearsay is nontestimonial and therefore admissible,
is absurd. Rather, the proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is
testimonial involves the statement’s use at trial. 136 This inquiry is not only
more relevant than how the statement was made or obtained, but is also
immune from manipulation by police, prosecutors, and even judges. After
Crawford, I wrote that
the term testimonial should be defined as all accusatory hearsay, i.e.,
hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the
identification of the defendant. To adopt a narrower definition . . . would
necessarily require a tremendous amount of judicial discretion under a
facts-and-circumstances analysis. 137

The Court comes frustratingly close to this realization on a number of
occasions. For example, in Davis, the Court analyzed whether the hearsay
statement was “‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial,” but,
because of the facts and circumstances surrounding the statement’s making,
concluded that it was not. 138 Similarly, in Bryant, the Court asked the same
question, and the majority came to the same conclusion. Justice Scalia,
however, felt that because the hearsay statement was made in response to
“structured questioning,” it was a “‘weaker substitute[] for live testimony at
trial.’” 139
While Scalia reaches the right conclusion, he misses the underlying
point: if the prosecutor uses a hearsay statement at trial, and that statement
135. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
136. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 543–45; see also Ross, supra note 134, at
196–97 (arguing similarly that the right of confrontation is a trial right, and the focus should
not be on how the statements were gathered, but rather on “how the out-of-court words are
being used in the particular trial”).
137. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 543 (emphasis added) (citing Robert Wm. Best,
To Be or Not to Be Testimonial? That Is the Question: 2004 Developments in the Sixth
Amendment, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2005, at 65; Reed, supra note 70, at 224). This proposed
definition, which includes the phrase “tends to establish in any way,” was specifically
intended to prevent another tactic by which a prosecutor can bypass the right of
confrontation. Even with a trial-based focus, a prosecutor can claim to offer accusatory
statements not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show why the police
investigated, and ultimately arrested, the defendant. If the judge permits this, the accusatory
statement is not considered hearsay and can be admitted ostensibly for those other purposes.
Obviously, this tactic is just another end around the Constitution, and sometimes courts will
see through the form and focus on the substance. See, e.g., Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030
(7th Cir. 2011) (reversing the trial court for allowing the prosecutor to introduce accusatory
statements not for their truth, but rather under the thin guise of demonstrating for the jury
why the police pursued a certain investigatory path). Interestingly, the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari in People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), where it will
address this end-around tactic in the very narrow context of forensic laboratory reports and
expert testimony.
138. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
139. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828) (“Neither [the declarant’s] statements nor the colloquy between him
and the officers would have been out of place at trial; it would have been a routine direct
examination.”).
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“tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification
of the defendant,” 140 then it is a substitute for live testimony at trial. For
example, if a declarant tells the police that “the defendant, John Doe,
punched me,” and the police later repeat that statement at John Doe’s trial
to prove either the identity of the defendant or any element of the crime
charged, then it is a weaker substitute—or, depending on the appearance
and credibility of the absent accuser, a stronger substitute—for live
testimony at trial.
Whether something is a substitute for live testimony at trial depends on
what happens in the courtroom. It is irrelevant for purposes of the
testimonial determination (which, in turn, determines admissibility) that a
police officer says that when he questioned the declarant, the declarant was
injured or appeared excited or fearful. It is also irrelevant that the police
officer says that his purpose when questioning the declarant was to inquire
whether the declarant feared a future attack, and not to collect evidence of a
past crime. Even if “the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the
primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency is presumably significantly
diminished,” 141 the Confrontation Clause is still very clear:
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed
in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of
reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about
how reliability can best be determined. 142

Until the Court heeds its own words and focuses on the hearsay’s use at
trial, instead of the manner in which the police say the statement was given
or taken, we might as well go back to the Roberts reliability framework.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
The Supreme Court should not completely replace a framework—here,
the Roberts reliability framework—with another framework that fails to
define its key term—here, the Crawford framework and the term
testimonial. That is, the Court should not “leave for another day any effort
to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” 143 If the Court
cannot decide on a definition for the framework’s key term, then the
140. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 543.
141. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157.
142. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (emphasis added). Although
beyond the scope of this Essay, the right of confrontation should also apply with equal force
to hearsay that does not involve the police. Perplexingly, Crawford held that “[a]n accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51. However, casual
remarks to acquaintances, when repeated at trial to prove the identity of the defendant or an
element of the crime, are testimonial because they are being used in place of testimony. And
if their casual nature (at the time of their making) were to somehow remove them from the
testimonial category, then they should still be excluded from trial, but on alternative
grounds: if the statements are too casual to qualify as testimony, then they cannot possibly
be used to convict a defendant of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
143. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
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uncertainty it creates is unlikely to be “interim” in nature, as it had
hoped. 144 If a complete framework cannot be implemented, then the Court
should not implement a new framework at all, especially not one that relies
on the very thing—judicial discretion—that it was supposedly trying to
constrain.
Nor should the Court speculate or meander when writing decisions. It
should write less. For example, in Davis, the Court wrote the following
with regard to defining an ongoing emergency: “In this case, for example,
after the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of
the moment, the emergency appears to have ended when Davis drove away
from the premises.” 145 But then, when the Michigan court reached the
same conclusion in Bryant, the Supreme Court had to find a way to
abandon its earlier position in Davis. To do so, the Court chastised the
Michigan court for misinterpreting Davis, and then craftily took the position
that it had “merely assumed . . . without deciding” that the emergency in
Davis had ended when Davis left the premises.146
But this does not ring true. The Court in Davis did not “assume”
anything; instead, it reached its own conclusion and found that the
emergency had ended. 147 Furthermore, if the Court knows in advance
which parts of its decision are to be taken seriously and which parts are to
be disregarded, then it simply should not write the parts that it wants to be
disregarded. Alternatively, if the Court claims that the distinction is one of
“holding” versus “dicta,” then the Court is selectively interpreting its own
cases so narrowly that they would have absolutely no applicability beyond
the precise set of facts in any particular case; this is not the role of a
nation’s highest court.
Finally, the Court should not blame lower courts for the problems created
by its decisions. For example, after the Michigan court followed Davis to
the letter, the Supreme Court continually referred to the lower court’s
“misunderstanding” 148 of Davis, and its “fail[ure] to appreciate”149 and its
“failure to focus” 150 on the Court’s language. The Court also stated that,
because the lower court “erroneously read” 151 Davis, it would now “provide
additional clarification with regard to what Davis meant,” 152 as if the lower
court simply was not capable of grasping the Court’s message the first time.
What the Court should have done is simply admit that it erred in
implementing another fact-intensive framework that relied almost
exclusively on judicial discretion, and that five justices 153 would have
144. See id. at 68 n.10.
145. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (parentheses omitted).
146. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158.
147. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
148. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.
149. Id. at 1158.
150. Id. at 1159.
151. Id. at 1158.
152. Id. at 1156.
153. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg dissented, Justice Kagan took no part in the decision,
and, although Justice Thomas concurred in the Court’s ultimate judgment, he did so for
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exercised their own discretion, under these particular facts, to reach a
different conclusion than the lower court. Instead, the Court “resurrect[ed]
Roberts by a thousand unprincipled distinctions without ever explicitly
overruling Crawford[.] After all, honestly overruling Crawford would
destroy the illusion of judicial minimalism and restraint.”154
It is unlikely that the Court will follow these—or any—lessons from the
“train wreck” it has made of the Confrontation Clause. 155 But all is not lost
for the right of confrontation. The individual states should, under their own
state constitutions, define testimonial as “all accusatory hearsay, i.e.,
hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the
identification of the defendant.” 156
Fortunately, individual states are not constrained “by the Supreme Court
of the United States if it is the judgment of [a state] that the Constitution of
[the state] and the laws of [the] state require that greater protection of
citizens’ liberties ought to be afforded.” 157 That is, even the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions “do not bind the individual state’s power to mold higher
standards under their respective state constitutions.” 158
With this course of action the right of confrontation can be restored, and
the individual states can do what the Court could not: “[I]nterpret the
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial
discretion.” 159

completely different reasons and criticized the majority for engaging in “‘an exercise in
fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no predictable results.’” Id. at 1167
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838–39 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In other words, it would be rare to
have a more bitterly divided Court.
154. Id. at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Blinka, supra note 18.
156. Cicchini & Rust, supra note 73, at 543. This proposal is, admittedly, somewhat
hopeful (or possibly naïve) in that many of the state courts—excluding, of course, the
Michigan Supreme Court as evidenced by Bryant—are the very courts that are distorting the
right of confrontation to begin with. The proposal is not completely far-fetched, however.
In fact, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, despite numerous state-leaning decisions in different
contexts, has afforded its citizens greater protection under its state constitution in at least two
cases. See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 700 N.W.2d 899 (affording greater protection under
the Wisconsin Constitution than is provided by the Fifth Amendment); State v. Dubose,
2005 WI 126, 699 N.W.2d 582 (affording greater protection under the Wisconsin
Constitution than is provided by the Fourteenth Amendment). Differences between the
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions may also exist regarding the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. See State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 796 N.W.2d 741 (discussing relevant
provisions of both the federal and state constitutions).
157. Knapp, 2005 WI 27, ¶ 59, 700 N.W.2d at 914.
158. Id. ¶ 57, 700 N.W.2d at 913 (emphasis added).
159. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).

